
Et quia forma facit esse in actu, ideo forma dicitur esse actus. Sicut autem omne quod est in potentia potest dici materia, ita omne a quo aliquid habet esse, quodcumque esse sit sive substantiale, sive accidentale, potest dici forma sicut homo cum sit potentia albus, fit actu albus, per albedinem et sperma, cum sit potentia homo, fit actu homo per animam. Hence, simply speaking, the form gives existence to matter the accident, however, does not give existence to the subject, rather the subject gives existence to the accident although sometimes the one is used for the other, namely matter for subject and conversely. But matter has existence by reason of what comes to it because, of itself, it has incomplete existence. In this way matter differs from subject because the subject is that which does not have existence by reason of something which comes to it, rather it has complete existence of itself ( per se) just as man does not have existence through whiteness.

#ESSE IN ENGLISH PRO#
Unde, simpliciter loquendo, forma dat esse materiae, sed subiectum accidenti, licet aliquando unum sumatur pro altero scilicet materia pro subiecto, et e converso.Ĥ. Sed materia habet esse ex eo quod ei advenit, quia de se habet esse incompletum. Thus we say that accidents are in a subject but we do not say that the substantial form is in a subject.Įt secundum hoc differt materia a subiecto: quia subiectum est quod non habet esse ex eo quod advenit, sed per se habet esse completum, sicut homo non habet esse ab albedine. Again, properly speaking, that which is in potency to substantial existence is called prime matter, but that which is in potency to accidental existence is called the subject. But these differ, because that which is in potency to substantial existence is called the matter from which, but that which is in potency to accidental existence is called the matter in which. Quod autem illud quod est in potentia ad esse accidentale dicatur subiectum, signum est quia dicuntur esse accidentia in subiecto, non autem quod forma substantialis sit in subiecto.ģ. Item, proprie loquendo, quod est in potentia ad esse accidentale dicitur subiectum, quod vero est in potentia ad esse substantiale, dicitur proprie materia. Sed in hoc differt: quia materia quae est in potentia ad esse substantiale, dicitur materia ex qua quae autem est in potentia ad esse accidentale, dicitur materia in qua. Both that which is in potency to substantial existence and that which is in potency to accidental existence can be called matter: for example sperm is the matter of man and man is the matter of whiteness.

Something is in potency to be man, as sperm or the ovum, and something is in potency to be white, as man. Moreover, for each existence there is something in potency. Tam illud quod est in potentia ad esse substantiale, quam illud quod est in potentia ad esse accidentale, potest dici materia, sicut sperma hominis, et homo albedinis.Ģ.

Aliquid enim est in potentia ut sit homo, ut sperma et sanguis menstruus aliquid est in potentia ut sit album, ut homo. The other is accidental existence, for example man is white, and this is existence secundum quid.Īd utrumque esse est aliquid in potentia. But existence is twofold: one is essential existence or the substantial existence of a thing, for example man exists, and this is existence simpliciter. Since some things can be, although they are not, and some things now are those which can be and are not are said to be potency, but those which already exist are said to be in act. Est autem aliud esse accidentale, ut hominem esse album, et hoc est esse aliquid.ġ. Sed duplex est esse: scilicet esse essentiale rei, sive substantiale ut hominem esse, et hoc est esse simpliciter. Illud quod potest esse dicitur esse potentia illud quod iam est, dicitur esse actu.

Nota quod quoddam potest esse licet non sit, quoddam vero est.
